PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS:
FREE OR INNOCENT? THE
INTERESTS AT STAKE

INTRODUCTION

One of the subjects scheduled for discussion by the Convention
on the Law of the Sea is passage through straits used for international navigation.'

The law that will cover international straits is

important because of the expected extension of the breadth of the
territorial sea to twelve miles; if this extension is agreed upon,

it will have the effect of enclosing as territorial water, straits of a
width of twenty-four miles or less. 2 By extending the sovereignty
of the states bordering international straits, straits which previously
contained a corridor for high seas traffic will assume the characteristics of sovereign owned property.
In anticipation of this extension of the breadth of the territorial
sea, the United States has stated that it will vote in favor of a
twelve mile limit, with one crucial condition-that a right of free
transitthrough international straits be adopted.3
The United States proposal on international straits has received
opposition in the United Nations Seabeds Committee from nations
taking the position that uncontrolled transit is not acceptable, arguing that the concept of innocent passage is sufficient to protect
both the interests of the international community and the coastal

states. The controversy over the two views raises basic questions
on the use of the sea in an area where the clash of international and
local interests is very real.
1. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 27 GAOR
Supp. 21 at 5, U.N. Doe. A/8721 (1972).
2. U.S. DEP'T STATE, GEOGRAPHIC BULL. No. 3, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA,

22-27 (rev. 1969) lists 106 straits of a width of 24 n.m. or less. I Preparatory Documents, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/6 and Add. 1 (1958) contains a description of the
major straits used by international traffic.
3. See statement of U.S. representative before Subcommittee II of the
Seabeds Committee, 65 ,DEVT STATE BULL. 261 (1971).
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The purpose of this paper is to examine interests involved in the
straits question, with emphasis on the interests of the coastal
states, and to propose a solution to the conflict. A proposal will
be made regarding the question of submerged passage by submarines through international straits. Two assumptions are made.
First, the Conference will settle on a territorial sea breadth of
twelve miles, and second, that neither group will consider its position on the straits issue so important that it will allow the Conference to fail without making a serious attempt at a compromise. 4
THE STATUS OF INTENATIONAL STRAITS

The question of passage through international straits was considered by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel
case.5 There, the Court was confronted with a claim for damages by the United Kingdom against Albania for damage done to
warships which struck mines while transiting the Corfu Channel,
in Albanian territorial waters. The Court first held that innocent
passage through international straits did exist for warships:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of peace
have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without
the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the
passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an international convention there is no right for a coastal
state to prohibit
such passage through straits in time of peace. 6
The Court found that although the trip through the channel had
been to "test" the reaction of the Albanian government, and the
crews of the ships were at battle stations, the passage was inno7
cent.
The Albanian government argued that the Corfu Channel was
not an international strait because it was of secondary importance,
used mainly by local traffic. The Court held that the strait was
of an international character.
[T]he decisive criterion is

.

.

. its geographical situation as con-

necting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used
for international navigation.8
4. This assumption is by no means certain. Outside events such as
the Arab oil embargo play an important part in the willingness of nations
to reach a compromise solution.
5. [1949] I.C.J. 4, 43 Am. J. IT'L L. 558 (1949).
6. Id. at 28, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. at 576.
7. Id. at 31, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. at 577. The Court attached some importance to the facts that the warships were steaming in peacetime formation and had their guns in trail and unloaded. Id. at 31, 43 AM. J. INTL. L.
at 578.
8. Id. at 28, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. at 576.
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Innocent passage for warships through international straits existed
in 1919; the straits covered by this rule were all those connecting
high seas.
THE

1958 CoNvENION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea 9 makes allowance for
international navigation by establishing the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of a coastal state by ships of foreign states. Passage is defined as navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of traversing the sea without entering internal waters'0 and innocent passage as that which " . . . is not

prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State."' :
Two specific instances of non-innocent passage are cited. First,
a fishing vessel might not be in innocent passage if it fished in the
territorial sea,12 and second, submarines must transit territorial waters on the surface and display their flag.' 3
The coastal state has no authority to prevent innocent passage
through international straits:
There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign
ships through straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas
or the territorial sea of a foreign State.14
The Convention articles make only one provision for warships;
that which permits the coastal state to require that the warship
leave the territorial waters if it does not comply with the regulations of the coastal state. 15 All other sections pertain to "all ships."
No mention is made of a right of innocent passage for warships
in the Convention, but from its articles and the Corfu Channel
case, such a right in international straits seems clearly established.
The definition of an international strait in the Convention covers
9. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
(hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Convention).
10. Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 14(2).
11. Id., Art. 14(4).
12. Id., Art. 14(5).
13. Id., Art. 14(6).

14. Id., Art. 16 (4).

15. Id., Art. 23.

not only straits that connect high seas, but also those which connect
high seas with the territorial waters of another state as, for ex16
ample, the strait of Tiran.
Some states do not recognize the right of innocent passage for
warships through their territorial sea.17 The Soviet Union entered
a reservation to the Convention stating its position that innocent
passage does not exist as a right for foreign warships. This view
was adopted by the People's Republic of China, which prohibits foreign warships from passing through the Chiungchow strait, and requires prior notice and authorization for the passage of merchant
8
ships, and then only under restricted conditions.'

THE 1971 UNITED

STATES

DRAFT ARTICLES

On August 3, 1971, the United States submitted its proposed draft
articles on the breadth of the territorial sea and passage through
international straits to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.' 0 (Seabeds Committee). Article I(1) recognizes a maximum breadth of the territorial sea of twelve nautical miles. This
article proposes a change from the traditional United States position,20 but is conditional on the adoption of Article I.
1. In straits used for international navigation between one part of
the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial
sea of a foreign state, all ships and aircraft in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight, for the pur16. This definition was adopted with the Arab-Israeli dispute over the
Gulf of Aqaba in mind. Gross, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea and the Right of Innocent Passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, 53 Am.
J. IDNTL L. 564 (1959).
17. The accepted definition of a warship is:
[A] ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the
external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and
whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew who
are under regular naval discipline.
Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, Art. 8(2), 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 182. (hereinafter cited as High
Seas Convention).
18. Order of the State Council of the Chinese People's Republic, 145th
Plenary Session, Jun. 5, 1964. Reprinted in 3 INT'L LEGAL M1 RUIAMs 926
(1964). China maintains the position that each state can determine unilaterally its jurisdiction over the territorial sea, as well as its breadth.
See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SR. 72 at 11 (1972) (statement of Chinese representative). It has been pointed out that China regards the Chiungchow
strait as her inland waters, and by allowing merchant passage is
recognizing innocent passage. Tao Cheng, Communist China and the Law
of the Sea, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 47, 61 (1969).
19. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.4 (1971).
20. S. SWARTZTRAUBER, THE TmmE MILE LnMrT OF TEmuTORIAL SEAS
(1972).
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pose of transit through and over such straits, as they have on the
high seas. Coastal States may designate corridors suitable for
transit by all ships and aircraft through and over such straits.
In the case of straits where particular channels of navigation are
customarily employed by ships in transit, the corridors, so far as
ships are concerned, shall include such channels.
2. The provisions of this article shall not affect conventions or other
international agreements already in force specifically relating to
particular straits.

While Article H has been termed by the United States as an
"inherent and inseparable adjunct of the freedoms of navigation
and overflight on the high seas themselves,"2 1 it does present new
ideas. The United States' concern touches on the basic nature of
the high seas and international straits, for should passage through
the major straits of the world be impeded, the concept of freedom
of the seas would be crippled.
A. Passageby Surface Vessels
In international straits more than six miles wide there presently
exists a strip of high seas. Vessels passing through this strip are
not subject to the control of the littoral states. A coastal state
however does have the authority to prevent passage through its
territorial sea which is not innocent.2 2 The coastal state may not
suspend innocent passage through international straits lying within
its territorial waters, but this implies that it can suspend noninnocent passage.
The United States proposal retains the high seas freedom of unrestricted transit through international straits. Its effect is this:
in straits of twenty-four miles in width or less, (assuming a twelve
mile limit) ships would retain a right to pass without having their
passage judged by the coastal state. Under innocent passage, the
coastal state could determine that the passage is not innocent, and
theoretically suspend such passage. A coastal state could argue
that the presence of a United States warship threatened its security interest so as to make the warship's passage non-innocent,
justifying forbidding the warship passage. Under the United States
proposal the coastal state does not have this argument, having
21. Statement of U.S. representative before Subcommittee H, supra note
3, 65 Ds 'T STATE BuLL. at 262.

22. Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 16(1), 16(3).

only the authority to establish the route shipping must take, and
then following established navigational channels.
Outside these designated lanes of "free transit" innocent passage apparently would apply. The criteria of innocence would be
applied to all shipping, and submarines would have to transit on
the surface, showing their flag, something they would not have to
do while transiting the designated corridors under the United States
proposal.
B. Overflight by Aircraft
Presently the right of overflight of the territorial sea of a state
by civil aircraft exists, limited to aircraft not engaged in scheduled air transport, and not including military aircraft.2 3 Overflight
is a right for aircraft over the high seas, 24 so under a three mile

limit an international strait wider than six miles contains a strip of
high seas over which all aircraft could fly without restriction.
The United States proposal allows overflight as a right even over
the territorial waters of the coastal state, and limits its authority
to designating air traffic corridors. The United States proposal
also does not distinguish between civil and military aircraft, in effect creating a new right for military aircraft to overfly the territorial waters of a foreign nation.
C. Passage by Submarines
By retaining the high seas freedoms of passage for submarines,
the United States proposal avoids the requirement of the Territorial
Sea Convention that when passing through the territorial sea of a
state, a foreign submarine must navigate on the surface and show
its flag.25 The United States submarine does not now have to surface when it passes through straits over six miles (twenty-four
miles under the proposed extension of the territorial sea) wide,
and the United States proposal would retain that right to pass
submerged.
The United States regards the adoption of Article I1 as most important. 20 Its public statements give the impression that this posi23. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Arts. 2, 3, 5, 7, Dec. 8,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. See also 1 Preparatory
Documents, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, at 336, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/31 (1958).
24. High Seas Convention, Art. 2 (4).
25. Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 14(6).
26. Our security, and that of our friends, depends upon freedom of
navigation and overflight of the high seas, and on free movement
through and over international straits. A significant portion of
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tion is more than a bargaining maneuver. For example, Mr. Stevenson in his statement before Sub-Com-ittee H of the Seabeds
Committee (Subcommittee II) referred to mobility on the sea and in
the air as "fundamental security interests" of our country and expressed the view that the Conference itself would be in jeopardy
if these special interests of the United States were not accomodated.2 7 As a major maritime nation, the United States shares the
concern of the international community in preserving freedom of
commerce. 28 A nation's security may be threatened when the flow
of trade goods and materials necessary for its economy is threatened. 29 For example, the flow of oil from the Mideast is affected
by the status of not only Arab-Israeli relations, but also by the
status of the straits of Gibralter and Bab-el-Mandeb.3 0 The shipments of large quantities of goods, including oil, depends primarily
on ocean transportation. 31 The security interest advanced by the
United States is not its strategic dependence on a free flow of goods
but the military flexibility of its Navy. The United States position
is that the doctrine of innocent passage is too subjective a device to

our strategic deterrent is seaborne. The trend to more extensive
territorial sea claims by other nations thus threatens very directly
our national security.
President Nixon's Third Annual Report to the Congress, Feb. 9, 1972, 66
DFP'T STATE BULL. 409 (1972). See also statement of U.S. representative
to the Seabeds Committee, Aug. 10, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.83, 67
DEP'T STATE BULL. 383 (1972).
27. [M]y Government would be unable to conceive of a successful
law-of-the-sea conference that did not accomodate the objectives
of these articles.
Statement of U.S. representative, supra note 3, 65 DE'T STAE BULL. at
263-64. (emphasis added).
28. Imports of developing countries have increased from $35,700,000
(U.S.) to $63,100,000 in the period from 1964 to 1971, while exports increased
from $34,600,000 to $61,400,000. U.N. MONTHLY BULL. STAT., vol. XXVI,
no. 12, Dec., 1972 at 110-11.
29. In 1970, the U.S. loaded 218,256,000 metric tons of international trade
at its ports, while unloading 292,786,000 metric tons. During 1970, the total
unloaded and loaded by Chile, Peru, Spain, Indonesia, and Malaysia in
international trade was 157,378,000 metric tons. Japan depends heavily on
imports, loading only 41,937,000 metric tons and unloading 435,875,000 metric
tons. Id. at xxxiii-xxxv.
30. The strait of Bab-el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of
Aden.
31. The tanker Torrey Canyon was "jumboized" to carry 850,000 barrels
of oil, weighing 117,000 tons. E. CowAx, Om AN WATER, THE TORREY
CANYox DISASTER 10 (1968).

allow3 2 to the coastal state in judging passage through international

straits.
The problem with subjective discretion lying in the coastal state
is made clear by the application of innocent passage to nonmilitary shipping. There is a general acceptance of the right of innocent passage for merchant ships.3 3

The Territorial Sea Conven-

tion calls for passage itself to be innocent, and does not take the
approach that a coastal state can act only if the actions of the
passing vessel are detrimental to its interests. While an unarmed merchant ship probably would not be capable of threatening the coastal state by its actions, the Convention allows the
coastal state to "use" less direct effects, such as the nature of the
cargo or its destination, to constitute the necessary prejudice to its
interests, providing support for interfering with passage.
The real contest on both sides of the question Is based on military grounds.3 4 The United States publicly stresses its national
security,35 and the opposing nations resist on much the same
grounds. A subjective decision by a coastal state that passage by
a United States fleet threatens its interests could hamper the flexible military response of the United States and could create the
possibility of conflict with the coastal state.
The effect of allowing the innocent passage doctrine to apply
in international straits is felt most strongly by the ballistic missile
submarine. The United States relies upon the ballistic missile submarine as an integral part of its nuclear deterrent. 36 The advantage of the Polaris-Poseidonsubmarine is in its secrecy. Surfaced, it is merely another ship, capable of detection; submerged,
it is all but undetectable. The secrecy of the ballistic missile submarine is allegedly vital to its use as a weapon, and a requirement that it surface when in transit through international straits
32. [T]he ambigious doctrine of "innocent passage" would otherwise
apply, and States bordering straits would be required to decide
which ships and planes should, and which should not, pass. Domestic and international pressures could be brought to bear on every
decision.
President Nixon's Third Annual Report to the Congress, Feb. 9, 1972, 66
DEP'T STATE BULL. 440 (1972).
33. M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PuBmc ORDER OF THE Ocs Ns 169-99

(1962).
34. The Department of Defense has exercised a great deal of influence
over policy in the area of the law of the sea. See Hollick, United States
Ocean Politics,10 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 467, 492 (1973).
35. See note 26 supra.
36. Approximately 20 Polaris-Poseidon submarines are on patrol at any
one time carrying 16 missles each, and some carry the Multiple Independently targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) which add 10 warheads per
Poseidon missile. JANE's FIGHnING Smps 409 (Blackman ed. 1972-73).
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such as Gibralter, reduces its secrecy and thus its effectiveness.
37
and
Only two other countries have ballistic missile submarines,
their use (essentially one of providing a military stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union) is not particularly
38
persuasive to other nations.
Support for the United States proposal on free transit came in
1972. The Soviet Union submitted to Subcommittee II its draft articles on straits used for international navigation, bearing striking
similarity to the United States articles.39
1. In straits used for international navigation between one part of
the high seas and another part of the high seas, all ships in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation, for the purpose of
transit through such straits, as they have on the high seas. Coastal
States may, in the case of narrow straits, designate corridors suitable for transit by all ships through such straits. In the case of
straits where particular channels of navigation are customarily
employed40 by ships in transit, the corridors shall include such
channels.
While almost identical to the United States Article I, the Soviet
articles limit the definition of an international strait to those
connecting two parts of the high seas, thus leaving innocent passage to apply to straits connecting high seas with the territorial
sea of another state.41 The Soviet articles also provide for the freedom of overflight through international straits in identical terms
as the United States Article 11.42
The Soviet articles go further than the United States proposal
and specify rules to be observed by aircraft and ships while in
transit. Of particular interest is the separation of ships into "all
ships" and "warships." Ships in general must, inter alia, avoid
threatening the security of the coastal state, comply with interna37. Id. at 341, 581, 582. The U.S.S.R. has 39 FBM submarines and the
U.K. has 4.
38. Remarks by the representative of Spain before Subcommittee II,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC.II/SR.42 at 53 (1972).
39. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC.II/L.7 (1972). The Soviet articles are in two
unnumbered articles, the first dealing with passage of ships and the second
with overflight of aircraft.
40. Id.
41. Remarks by the Soviet Representative before Seabeds Committee,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.83 at 72 (1972).
42. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.7 (1972).
The Soviet representative
indicated that IMCO would be the appropriate body to set up navigational
rules for international straits. Supra note 41.

tional rules concerning prevention of accidents at sea, and avoid
causing pollution or damage to the coastal state. 43
The rules on warships are more specific as to actions considered
a threat to a coastal state's security. Warships shall not conduct
exercises or gunfire, launch any weapons or aircraft, undertake
hydrographical work or engage in acts "unrelated to transit.144
The second article of the Soviet proposal covers overflight by
aircraft. Overflights are restricted to designated altitudes and air
corridors, and threats to the security of the coastal state are once
again to be avoided. Military aircraft shall not use any weapons,
take aerial photographs, circle or dive toward ships, take on fuel, or
45
engage in acts "unrelated to overflight.1
These articles admit the security interest of the coastal state, and
provide restrictions on passing vessels, but they also severely restrict the authority of the coastal state to a greater extent than
the Territorial Sea Convention. 46 Not only can the coastal state
not suspend traffic through a strait, but it cannot, under the
Soviet articles, even interfere with shipping or even require communication from vessels in transit.
THE STRAIT STATES DRAFT ARTIcLEs

Another set of draft articles for the territorial sea and straits used
for international navigation were presented in 1973 by Greece, Cyprus, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, the Philippines, Spain and Yemen.4 7 These articles are interesting because they present the views
of a group of states that actually border on important international straits, including Gibralter and Malacca.4 s These articles
are supported by China, 49 while the United States disapproves of
their contents. 50
The articles submitted by the strait states rest orA what are
termed five "basic considerations." First, navigation through
43. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.7 (1972).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 16(4) only forbids suspension of the right of innocent passage.
47. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18 (1973).
48. Spain and Morocco border the Strait of Gibralter, Yemen the Strait
of Bab-el-Mandeb, and Indonesia and Malaysia the Strait of Malacca.
49. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.62 at 238 (1973).
50, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.58 at 130 (1973). The U.S. objected
that the articles were vague on the right of the coastal state to be compensated. The U.K. and France saw the questions of international straits
and the territorial sea as separate problems. Id. at 162-64.
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the territorial sea and international straits is to be treated as a
single subject. Second, innocent passage is the best principle to
balance the interests of the international community with those of
coastal states. Third, any regulation of navigation should promote
the safety of maritime commerce and the security of the coastal
state. Fourth, technological changes require regulation of ships
with "special characteristics." Fifth, regulation should solve the
"deficiencies" of the 1958 Convention with respect to warships.5 '
The strait states' articles on the territorial sea are identical with
the Territorial Sea Convention on the question of passage, adopting
that definition of innocent passage and the requirement of surface transit by submarines. Where the articles deal with international straits they present difficulties. In accord with the Territorial Sea Convention, the strait states' articles forbid a charge on
passage, but Article 11 provides that "[t] he coastal state shall have
the right to be compensated for works undertaken to facilitate passage." 52 No suggestion is provided as to how this "compensation"
will be paid, by whom, or what the effect of non-payment will be.
The strait states' proposal, in Article 14, singles out "ships with
special characteristics:"
The coastal State may regulate the passage through its territorial
sea of the following:
(a) Nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying nuclear weapons;
(b) Ships carrying nuclear substances or any other material which
may endanger the coastal State or pollute seriously the marine
environment;
(c) Ships engaged in research of the marine environment. 53

In Article 15 the coastal state is allowed to require prior notification or authorization before nuclear-powered ships or ships
carrying nuclear weapons will be allowed passage.54 For these
ships, Article 16 makes their passage conditional upon prior notification, the carrying of insurance, and the use of designated sea
lanes during transit. 55
Article 21 of the proposal refers to passage by warships. The concept of innocent passage is applied to warships, but the coastal
51. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II.18 at 1-2 (1973).
52. Id. at 5.

53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 6-7.
55. Id. at 7.

state may also require notification or authorization before giving
permission for passage.5 6 If passage is granted, the warship passes
through the strait under the innocent passage but is restricted from
certain activities:
Foreign warships exercising the right of innocent passage shall not
perform any activity which does not have a direct bearing with
the passage, such as:
(a) Carrying out any exercise or practice with weapons of any
kind;
(b) Assuming combat position by the crew;
(c) Flying their aircraft;
(d) Intimidation of displaying of force;
(e) Carrying out research operations of any kind. 57
The strait states' proposal effectively allows each coastal state to
adopt its own rule as to whether innocent passage through international straits exists for warships. The power to demand authorization before passage turns a right of innocent passage into a privilege dependent on the discretion of the coastal state. Even if a
right of passage without prior approval is adopted, under the proposal the coastal state will have wide discretion over ships powered
by and carrying nuclear materials. If the strait states' proposed
articles are viewed as the interests of the coastal states, and the
United States articles are viewed as representing the international
community, the two are irreconcilable.
INTERESTS 58 AT STAKE IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS

Fish

Fishing resources are a major reason for demands to extend
the breadth of the territorial sea. 59 Most fish are available near
land masses, so an extension of the exclusive rights of a state
through its sovereignty over its territorial sea guarantees it the
opportunity to exploit stocks off its shores without competition from

foreign fishermen. The coastal state should have as much interest in
the preservation and use of its fishing grounds as international shipping concerns have in the passage through international straits
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id., Art. 22(2).
58. Professors McDougal and Burke argue that a community interest
exists, expressed in inclusive claims to the high seas freedoms, and
opposed by the exclusive claims of authority of the coastal state. McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives
versus National Egoism, 67 YALE L.J. 539, 546 (1958). For an argument
that a definite community interest does not exist see Sorensen, Law of
the Sea, 520 INT'L CONC. 195, 199 (1958).
59. M. McDouGAL & W. 'BURKE, THE PuBLIc ORDER OF THE OcEAsS 183
(1962).
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which contain fishing areas. Fishing is affected by free transit.
The basic danger to fish (excluding for the moment the question
of pollution) is the foreign fishing fleet. The Territorial Sea Convention expressly allowed the coastal state to forbid fishing by
foreign vessels during passage. The United States proposal would
not change the status of foreign fishermen since it is limited to
preservation of a right of transit.
Oil Pollution
The coastal states involved in the straits proposal have indicated
their concern over pollution of their shores by oil.60 The advent of
the supertanker and the Torrey Canyon grounding 61 are factors behind the strait states' proposal. This concern is not limited to the
straits states, but has received attention in Conventions regarding
3
and the
pollution of the sea by oil,62 liability for such pollution
right of a state to intervene on the high seas in the event of a
casualty.64 The coastal state has an interest in seeing that the
passage through straits in its territorial waters by supertankers is
made safely. No control over tankers is provided by the United
States or Soviet proposals except to the extent that the coastal state
may designate traffic corridors. Both proposals rely on international regulations that would be established apart from any document coming out of the Law of the Sea Convention to meet the
problem of safety of navigation through straits.
As the effect of a massive oil spill or casualty is primarily felt
by the coastal state near the spill, its interest in safe transit cannot be denied. However, the problem is enormous, and enormous
on an international scale, and probably beyond the expertise of any
single coastal state. For one state to claim the expertise and
60. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18 art. 16 (1973) refers to any other
material which may endanger the coastal state or pollute.
61. For an account of the Torrey Canyon grounding and its effect on
the shores of Britian and Normandy, see E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER, THE
ToRREY CANYON DISASTER (1968).

62. International Convention for the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done at
London May 12, 1954, (1961), 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
63. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done at Brussels Nov., 1969, reproduced
in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25 (1970).

64. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45
(1970).

done at Brussels Nov. 1969, reproduced in 9

capability, and resulting authority, to control traffic through its
straits may be another way of imposing a unilateral claim over
those straits. As the nature of the traffic is international, the best
source of regulation and control for safety purposes is through international bodies.65
Military Security
The most controversial interest of the coastal state is its security.
The term may mean different things to each state, but is here used
in its military sense, excluding the passage of commercial ships even
though the cargo and destination may have a bearing on the ability
of the coastal state to maintain its military effectiveness.
Under innocent passage, the coastal state is limited in its action
against a warship to ordering it to leave the territorial sea, and in
straits themselves cannot suspend their innocent passage. To protect its security, the coastal state applies the criteria of innocent
passage, and if the presence of the warship is found to be offensive, may order it to depart. The Soviet view requires previous
authorization before passage can be accomplished. This approach
turns what is a right of passage into at best a privilege.6 6
The security interest of the coastal state is the key issue in the
controversy. The coastal states want some control over foreign
warships transiting their waters, 67 and feel innocent passage will
give them sufficient protection of their interest. They view their
security interest as unchanged in international straits and possibly
even more critical due to the numbers of warships that would be
transiting their straits.
The delegate from Spain to the Seabeds Committee has expressed
his concern over the United States proposal on the following
grounds: that a spy plane could conduct overhead observation of
neighboring coastal states while in transit; that a danger of confrontation between military powers exists in the straits; that nuclear arms and other materials endanger the coastal state by
their proximity; and that a coastal state that allows free passage to
all vessels during times of crisis may suffer from adverse political
65. See International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at
Sea (1960), 16 U.S.T. 794, T.LA.S. 5813.

66. Butler, The Legal Regime of Russian Territorial Waters, 162 Am. J.
II T'L L. 51, 69 (1968).

67. The United States has established a series of Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) including zones around the Panama Canal and Guam,
extending over high seas. 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.43, 99.45 (1973). These zones
are established for the identification and control of civil aircraft. Id. at
§ 99.3.
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reaction.68 The Spanish delegate's concern has been adopted in the
strait states' proposal which lists as a ship of "special characteristics" the nuclear powered vessel. The major problem is the
nuclear warship, primarily the ballistic missle submarine. This
vessel represents a mixture of military and environmental interests on both sides. For example, the problem presented by the requirement for surface passage under the Territorial Sea Convention, as applied to the ballistic missile submarine, involves the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union
as well as free navigation, and nuclear pollution from an uncontrollable source operating near the country most affected by any
major pollution-the coastal state.
Self-Image
Many of the nations now considering the law of the sea were not
in existence during the 1958 Conference. 69 National pride can of itself lead to desires to resist the proposals of countries primarily
motivated by military interests. 70 It may also create the intention
to use the issue of international straits as a method of restricting
the use of military power and force a neutralization of military
strength, effecting a de facto disarmament. 71 The nationalism of
a state is not of itself an interest, but coupled with any legitimate
interest of a coastal state, it accentuates the need to provide adequate assurances to the coastal state that its interests have been
protected in any forthcoming international agreement on the straits
question.
68. Oil can take on more importance than usual during certain times of
the year.
Saudi Arabia and Algeria, the biggest Arab suppliers of oil and
liquified gas to the United States, yesterday announced they have
stopped all exports to the United States....

[T]he countries were

taking the step because of 'continuing American aid to Israel' in the
Mddle East War.
San Diego Union, Oct. 21, 1973, A-l, col. 3.
69. Remarks of the delegate of Equador before Subcommittee II, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.54 at 75 (1973).
70. The delegate of Egypt phrased the issue as not the passage of

merchant ships, but whether the coastal state should allow free passage
through its straits by warships and submarines of foreign powers without
exercising its right to safeguard its security. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/
SR.59 at 154-55 (1973) (emphasis added).
71. Knauss, The Military Role in the Ocean and its Relation to the Law
of the Sea, PROCEEDING OF THE SIxTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF
THE SEA INsTrTUTE 77, 85 (1971).

COMPROMISE
Innocent passage criteria do not provide a clear enough basis for
handling conflicts over passage through straits, and also do not assure protection of the interests of either side of the conflict. Either
side may take its own position on what is "prejudicial" to the peace
or security of the coastal state. A flag state could conduct activities
which it maintains are "innocent" and the coastal state may be
unable to force a confrontation over its opposing view.7 2 The subjective nature of the criteria, and the definite possibility of biased
arguments on either side, not just the coastal state's, is the weakness
of innocent passage, and should be avoided in any new regime for
international straits.
One possible solution would be to create corridors of high seas, 73
or an international zone running through the major international
straits.7 4 The width of the territorial sea could be limited in
straits to a percentage of the width of the strait, allowing the opposing coastal states a certain portion of the strait as territorial
sea, with the remaining part a strip of high seas.7 5 The difficulty
with these proposals is that they retain complete high seas freedoms through the straits, and not the limited freedom of transit
advocated by the United States.
The Soviet proposal presents a middle ground between the United
States' and strait states' proposals by establishing the right of unimpeded transit, while at the same time restricting the manner in
which that right is to be exercised. The restrictions placed on
transiting traffic are specific while at the same time including an
amount of subjectivity in the "unrelated to transit" restriction.
Admittedly, states will be reluctant to commit themselves to restrictions that may prove unattractive in later years, but without
some compromise, the positions taken by the two camps are completely opposed. If the direction of the Law of the Sea Convention
is toward reaching a result, compromise over the straits issue is
necessary, and the Soviet view should provide the best middle
ground.
72. Indonesia, for example, has only 15 destroyers and frigates with 18
FIGHxNG SHps, 161 (Blackman ed.
1972-73).
73. Remarks by the Soviet delegate to the Seabeds Committee, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SR.83 at 70 (1972).
74. A discussion of alternate proposals to re-define the extent of
territorial seas in the straits is found in Knight, The 1971 United States
Proposals on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and Passage Through InternationalStraits, 51 ORE. L. REv. 754 (1972).
75. Knauss, supra note 71, at 86.

patrol and subchaser craft. JAN's
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The international community is interested in unimpeded transit
through international straits. This interest is protected by not allowing the coastal state to stop or unnecessarily impede direct
transitthrough the straits.
The coastal state is interested in guarding against the harmful
effects of passing traffic. This would be assured by the restrictions on the conduct of passing vessels and aircraft. The retrictions should be aimed at military activities only, which either
directly threaten or reasonably appear to threaten the coastal state.
The Soviet provisions covering use of weapons, and military exercises illustrate and provide a starting place for negotiation.
Will specific restrictions on passage satisfy the interests of the
coastal state? Fishing interests are satisfied by the prohibition of
fishing by foreign vessels while in transit. Threats to military security can be accommodated in part by restricting the activities of
passing warships. This places the emphasis on the actions of the
warship, and not on the fact of passage itself, reducing to some extent the subjective application of criteria by the coastal state. The
problem is that the presence of a warship itself can be a threat
and to find complete security the coastal state must forbid such
presence (passage). The purpose of a convention is to establish law
for times of peace. If no hostilities exist between the coastal state
and warships in transit, the "threat" is problematical and insufficient to justify wide discretion in the coastal state over traffic
through the straits. If the coastal state cannot be allowed to suspend passage of warships, then a reasonable alternative is to restrict
the activities of the warship while they are transiting through
straits in territorial waters.
The fleet ballistic missile submarine complicates this approach.
The United States patrols about twenty ballistic missile submarines
at one time.76 The Soviet Union has about thirty-nine ballistic
missile submarines. 77 The balance of power in this area, due to the
small numbers of submarines involved, is effected by, a break in
their secrecy. The mission of the submarine, however, is not necessarily to penetrate the territorial sea of a coastal state; for with
missiles capable of long range attacks, the logical place to make
76. JANE's FIGHENG SHIPs, supra note 36.
77. Id. at 577.

use of that capability would be some distance from the intended
target. The presence of a FBM submarine in an international
strait running submerged probably means that it is not intending
to launch its missiles against the coastal states bordering the strait.
The presence of the submarine does present the strait state with a
problem of identity. Not all submarines carry ballistic missiles;
some retain their more traditional attack mission. The coastal state,
assuming it detects the submarine, does not know what type it
has discovered. A ship or aircraft is more easily detected than a
submarine, and its basic nature more readily determined. While
a coastal state may agree that the presence of a FBM submarine
does not mean an attack is necessarily intended, it wishes to know
whether it is an FBM submarine, or one designed to attack shipping. While restrictions on the military operations of transiting
vessels might be adopted, it is futile to expect that adoption when
there is no way for the coastal state to know if the FBM submarine
is following those restrictions.
How vital is submerged transit to the effectiveness of the ballistic
missile submarine? If the submarine passes a strait surfaced it
may easily be detected, but after passing the strait it can re-submerge and regain its secrecy for the most part. However, if the
submarine cannot maintain its secrecy even when passing through
a strait submerged, then the importance of submerged transit
dwindles as there is no real impact on its effectiveness. Regardless
of this, there may be some influence on the overall effectiveness of
the ballistic missile submarine by requiring surface transit, but the
purpose of an international body of laws is not to guarantee to one
or two countries unlimited freedom to deploy their weapons according to their desires.
CONCLUSION

The maritime powers proposing a right of free transit through
international straits must recognize the interests of the coastal
state. The United States proposal is directed at more than assuring
transit through international straits, for under present law, the
coastal state cannot suspend passage through those straits. The
United States proposal would also assure the manner of transit for
its submarines. The proposal is aimed at protection of the military
weapons of the United States and should be unpersuasive in an attempt to establish new international law. The concept of retention
of the high seas freedom of navigation through the straits is, however, a necessary and important doctrine. The difficulty lies in its
collateral effect on submarines.
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The approach taken by the Soviet Union is the best solution to
the problem of transit through international straits. Applying
the concept of free transit through international straits with restrictions on the conduct of vessels and aircraft while in transit provides the middle ground for opposing interests. The key to this
form of compromise lies in the manner of application and the restrictions adopted. The coastal state should have its control of the
route of traffic, but should not have the authority to close the
strait.
The United States should be liberal in accepting restrictions on
the conduct of vessels in transit. The first concern of the United
States is in unimpeded transit and the United States could seriously consider accepting the restrictions in the strait states' pro78
posed articles.
The key restriction the United States must consider is that requiring surface transit by submarines. The dependence of the international community on a free flow of trade makes the concept of
free transit vital. This is especially so in view of the use of oil
control by Arab nations as a means to achieve political and military ends. Agreement on a solution retaining high seas freedom
of transit through international straits is too important to be jeopardized by insistence on a right to transit submerged. If agreement can be reached on the United States proposal in the form of
the Soviet proposal, by the United States agreeing to surface transit
for its submarines, then it should agree to such a restriction.
FRANK NOLTA

78. See note 57 supra.

